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Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups 
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Abstract 
What are the most efficient strategies to prevent coups d’état? The answer depends on whether 
the coup is attempted by elite officers or by lower ranking combat officers. Elite officers and 
lower ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities to 
perpetrate a coup. As a result, the success of coup-proofing critically depends on coup agency. 
Using original data on coup agency, public spending and officer salaries in the Middle East 
and North Africa, we find counter-balancing and higher shares of defense spending to be 
effective for preventing elite officer coups. Combat officer coups are best prevented by 
increasing social spending. Political liberalization has an ambivalent effect on military agents, 
decreasing coup risk for combat officer, but making elite officer coups more likely. Our 
findings suggest the necessity to differentiate between specific coup types and rethink coups 
as purely elite-led power grabs to fully explore the rationale of junior coup plotters. 
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On the night of 22 July 1952, a small group of young, mid-ranking army officers around Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, Abdel Hakim Amer, and Khaled Mohey Eddin seized power in Egypt. In a 
surprise move, the coup plotters used an artillery unit and a battalion of ground forces under 
their command to arrest the military leadership and seize control of the military headquarters 
and other strategic buildings and locations in Egypt’s capital Cairo. By the early hours of the 
following day, tanks in the streets and the speed with which the operation was executed, 
secured the success of a coup plot that later came to be narrated as the “1952 Revolution.” 
Apart from the revolution narrative, and of course the take-over of political power by military 
personnel, Nasser’s 1952 coup d’état does not have much in common with another military 
intervention in Egypt almost six decades later: the take-over of the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces (SCAF), on 11 February 2011. SCAF represented the regime’s military leadership, led 
by then-minister of defense Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and chief-of-staff Sami Annan, and 
took over power in response to an Arab Spring-type uprising that saw masses of Egyptians 
demand the ousting of president Hosni Mubarak. The military’s power grab was made public 
on TV through the forced abdication of Mubarak and his chosen would-be successor, vice 
president Omar Suleiman. No single shot was fired, and no arrests were made in what 
essentially turned out to be the establishment of a military junta ruling the country through its 
immediate post-Arab Spring transition period. 
These two episodes in Egyptian politics represent essentially different types of military 
coups. The 1952 coup d’état was executed by a group of junior and mid-ranking officers who, 
at the time of their take-over, had not been members of the political elite coalition and who 
have been in opposition to their own military leadership as much as the state’s political 
incumbency. The episode marks what we conceptualize as a combat officer coup (COC). The 
2011 episode saw high-ranking officers take over power who had already been part of the 
political elite; we conceptualize these coups as elite officer coups (EOC). 
We maintain that these two coup types are fundamentally different in some theoretically 
intriguing ways. While all these officers obviously share a strong motivation to taking over 
political power, major differences pertain to their incentives and opportunities to execute coup 
plots. The top-brass of the officer corps are members of political elite coalitions in authoritarian 
regimes. Those officers attempt coups d’état whenever their position within the elite coalition 
is compromised and when they have the capacities to coordinate among each other. By contrast, 
combat officer coups in the vast majority of cases feature junior and mid-ranking officers. 
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Those officers look at military service as a job with a regular income, rather than a stake in 
political power. Weapons and their direct command over enlisted men endow them with the 
coercive force to overpower, typically in a surprise move, both political incumbents as well as 
their commanding officers. Concerning their incentive environment, the state’s ability to 
provide them with social welfare and the absence of rights and liberties figure more 
prominently as drivers of military coups. 
The distinction between elite officer coups and combat officer coups can best be studied 
through a systematic comparison of the factors that keep these different coup plotters in the 
barracks. Variation in the effectiveness of coup-proofing measures offers empirical support for 
our treatment of different coup types and their different causal underpinnings. We account for 
four different measures, all of which are assumed to have coup-proofing effects: military 
spending, social spending, counter-balancing, and political opening through liberalization. 
Drawing on original data on coups d’état, state budgets, and officer salaries in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), we test the impact of those policies with regards to their assumed 
effects for coup-proofing using quantitative methods. Employing MENA data is particularly 
promising because in this region coup-proofing has effectively reduced the number of coup 
incidents in the absence of democratization. By contrast, the decline of coup incidents in other 
world regions often coincided with the transition to democracy. Hence the focus on the MENA 
region allows us to study the effects of coup-proofing under broadly similar conditions: coup-
proofing as part of an authoritarian tool-set applied to keep autocrats in power.  
The results of our inquiry support our theoretical expectations. Causal underpinnings 
of elite officer coups are essentially defined by those officers being members of authoritarian 
elites that would execute coup attempts “from above.” In addition to high military budgets, 
counter-balancing – as a strategy designed to increase barriers for coup plotters’ coordination 
efforts – turns out to be the most effective mechanism undermining elite officer coups. This 
corroborates previous findings on coups more broadly. We also find support for our broad 
assumption that elite officers are particularly motivated to execute coups in order to counter, 
and eventually roll-back, political liberalization efforts. Yet, counter-balancing remains 
ineffective to ward off combat officer coups. There is substantial empirical support for viewing 
these combat officers as members of society writ large who rely on the state’s welfare provision 
for their overall well-being. Our findings reveal that social spending and political liberalization 
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significantly reduce the risk of combat officer coups. Hence their attempted take-overs are 
coups “from below.”  
In emphasizing variation among coup agents, this article refines our understanding of 
the phenomenon of coups d’état and the effective strategies to prevent them. More specifically, 
while most conventional cross-national datasets have failed to distinguish between different 
types of coups, accounting for the variation in coup agency is necessary to adequately measure 
coup-proofing effects. Moreover, by accounting for complexity in officer grievances at various 
levels of the military hierarchy, we introduce social spending and political liberalization as new 
instruments in the coup-proofing literature that have so far gone largely unnoticed in systematic 
accounts of the subject field.  
 
Theorizing Agency in Military Coups 
In this section, we review the literature on the causes of coups and mechanisms of coup-
proofing with particular emphasis on coup agency. Our guiding assumption is that Elite Officer 
Coups (EOCs) are fundamentally different from Combat Officer Coups (COCs) in various 
theoretically intriguing ways. Our analysis focuses on differences pertaining to the causes and 
mechanisms of coup plots, while recent scholarship emphasizing variation among coups was 
primarily concerned with the outcome of coups, such as regime change. Aksoy, Carter and 
Wright (2015), for instance, distinguish coups reshuffling political leaderships from regime-
changing coups. Other recent works explored “democratic coups” as those military take-overs 
triggering democratic transition (Lehoucq and Perez-Linan 2014; Marinov and Goemans 2014; 
Tansey 2016). 
According to Powell and Thyne, coups d’état are “illegal, overt attempts by the military 
or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne 
2011, 252). Concerning coup agency, we follow existing scholarship distinguishing between 
coup plotters as to their position in the military hierarchy (Kandeh 2004; Singh 2014; Albrecht 
2015). More specifically, we define an Elite Officer Coup as any successful or unsuccessful 
coup carried out by a country’s military leadership, comprising chief-of-staff members, officers 
in command councils, and commanders of a military’s functional units (army, air force, navy). 
A Combat Officer Coup in turn designates any successful and unsuccessful coup plotted by 
mid- and lower-ranking officers; plotters in the latter category may in some cases include 
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individual higher-ranking officers – such as officers in the rank of general or major – who are 
not members of the military leadership. The key difference is that elite officers are members of 
authoritarian ruling coalitions; combat officers are not. 
The term “coup-proofing” refers to strategies aimed at reducing the ability or the 
incentives of elites to stage a coup (Powell 2012, 1018). Effective measures employed for coup-
proofing have long been studied, originally in small-n studies (Brooks 1998; Gaub 2013; 
Kamrava 2000; Quinlivan 1999). Such measures include the establishment of parallel security 
apparatuses in the form of “counter-balancing” (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Powell 2014; Singh 
2014; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2016; Sudduth 2017a; De Bruin 2017); the frequent rotation 
of officers in their assigned posts and the reorganization of the armed forces (Talmadge 2016); 
“ethnic stacking” of key positions in the army with co-ethnics deemed most loyal to the power 
holders (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Roessler 2011; Harkness 2016; Bellin 2012; Nepstad 
2013); and elite management in the form of purges (Sudduth 2017b) or the institutionalization 
of political succession (Frantz and Stein 2016). 
This body of literature has greatly advanced our understanding of the variable nature of 
coup-proofing. Yet, we see two major weaknesses: first, there are very few systematic tests of 
the effectiveness of different coup-proofing strategies, and those that exist have produced 
inconsistent, at times conflicting findings. Second, and relatedly, the coup-proofing literature 
has failed to systematically distinguish between different coup agents and thus conflated coups 
of a distinctive nature.1 In the following, we propose a more fine-grained account of coup-
proofing measures – and by extension coup causes. This is to differentiate between officers’ 
incentives and capacities to execute coups as well as between elite and combat officers as coup 
agents. In doing so, we primarily focus on those coup-proofing strategies and coup causes for 
which it is possible to predict differential effects. 
                                                          
1 Prominent exceptions include Singh (2014), Albrecht (2015), and Albrecht and Ohl (2016) 
who emphasize agency within military apparatuses. Roessler (2011), Harkness (2016), and Bou 
Nassif (2015)—among other scholars—highlight ethnic identities within military apparatuses 
in sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region. Among the very few scholars distinguishing 
between specific types of coups, Kandeh’s (2004) treatment of coups “from below” comes 
closest to the approach underlying our contribution. 
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Incentives for Coups 
To begin with the personal incentives of officers to stage a coup, the literature has 
conceptualized such officer grievances as corporate (Finer 2002; Huntington 1957), with a 
strong emphasis on the degree to which political decision makers allocate material resources 
to the armed forces. Endowing the military with economic resources and material benefits 
would then serve as an effective coup-proofing strategy targeting agents throughout the 
military hierarchy (Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Conrad, Kim, and Souva 2013; Rittinger and 
Cleary 2013; Bove and Nistico 2014). Empirically, this has been tested using some indicator 
of military expenditures, typically measured as a share of GDP or per soldier (e.g., Leon 2014; 
Powell 2012). 
Most accounts in this body of literature, however, fail to emphasize that military 
spending affects elite officers and combat officers in different ways. For elite officers, the 
military budget is an instrument to access and control resources to maintain their own patronage 
networks within the military. These networks are underpinned by a logic of partial dependence 
and patrimonial loyalty, which links elite to mid-ranking officers within the armed forces. In 
Egypt, for instance, elite officers use so-called “loyalty allowances” as an important instrument 
of patronage to ensure the support of lower-ranking officers (Bou Nassif 2013). In addition, 
elite officers use their available resources to establish patronage networks with non-military 
actors. In Yemen, the military budget is a key instrument for elite officers to channel funds to 
tribal elites, thus ensuring their loyalty (Knights 2013). Similarly, Syrian and Algerian generals 
utilize their resources to establish important business linkages, a process that often plays out 
among rivalling clans and elite networks (Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003; Aboud 2002). This 
form of patronage politics is facilitated by the lack of civilian oversight of military budgets in 
most MENA countries (Chams El-Dine 2013; Sater 2009).  
Elite officers also care about the defense budget as it reflects the balance of power vis-
à-vis other branches of the administration, including possibly paramilitary units controlled by 
rivalling elites, such as Interior Ministries. In this sense, the size of a military budget defines 
elite officer’s bargaining power within the regime. Personal enrichment plays a subordinate 
role in this context, simply because members of authoritarian ruling coalitions enjoy manifold 
opportunities of self-enrichment regardless of the size of any particular budget. Individually, 
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they can always cash in on their political influence – either during the time of their military 
service or, more often than not, once they transfer from military service to lucrative positions 
in the state apparatus (Sayigh 2012; Bou Nassif 2013). 
Combat officers, by contrast, perceive military service primarily as professional 
employment. They care very little about the size of the military budget relative to other 
governmental spending. Rather, they experience military spending mainly in form of suitable 
equipment and a decent salary. As direct superiors of rank-and-file soldiers, their perception is 
also shaped by their subordinates. Lacking an independent source of patronage, they therefore 
crucially rely on the state to provide them and their subordinates with decent salaries and 
equipment. Otherwise, if the army’s infrastructure is in a bad shape, they are going to be the 
ones to suffer in combat. Taken together, we therefore submit the following hypotheses:  
H1: High levels of military spending relative to other government agencies reduce the risk of 
elite officer coups.  
H2: High levels of military spending per soldier reduce the risk of combat officer coups. 
While a corporate perspective of the military is solidly established, non-corporate 
grievances have remained under-analyzed in the literature, at least in part because it requires 
disaggregating “the” military and accounting for the interests and demands of individual agents 
within that organization. This is particularly visible in the total disregard of all non-military 
public spending and its effect on officers’ grievances. A primary function of state spending is 
the provision of public services to the citizenry in the form of education, health care, housing, 
and subsidies. While social spending differs from military spending, it is intuitive to assume 
that different patterns in social spending have discrete consequences for differents agents in the 
military hierarchy. As Besley and Robinson (2010) rightly point out, officers’ preferences for 
spending on public services are not homogenous. Instead, following Korpi (2006), these 
preferences depend on officers’ socio-economic status and their ability to substitute public 
welfare provision with private goods. This ability, in turn, varies considerably between elite 
and combat officers.  
Being part of the authoritarian ruling coalition, elite officers enjoy access to numerous 
sources of income, which places them in a highly privileged economic position. According to 
military remuneration data we collected for a number of MENA states, their monthly salaries 
generally exceed the median household income by at least 2.5 and the average monthly salary 
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by at least 2 times.2 These ratios can reach up to 87 and 21 times respectively in countries with 
high agricultural employment and, as a result, a highly skewed income distribution. Morocco 
serves as a prominent example. What is more, elite officers have access to numerous additional 
income streams. In the Gulf countries, for instance, elite officers often hail from royal families 
and thus benefit from the lavish spoils handed out to royals (Lutterbeck 2013; Hertog 2011). 
In Egypt, senior officers frequently obtain leading positions in government agencies and state-
owned enterprises while officially still in active service. They reach monthly salaries ranging 
from 16,000 to 166,000 USD (Sayigh 2012). Bashar al-Assad in Syria “allowed the military 
barons of his regime to amass huge wealth by building economic partnerships with prominent 
businessmen” (Bou Nassif 2015, 269). Elite officers thus receive private health care in 
European or US institutions, and they can afford to send their offspring to study at elite 
universities abroad.  
The situation is very different for combat officers. According to our remuneration data 
(Table A3 in online appendix), combat officers are at best members of the middle class. This 
is certainly true for Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen where the starting salary of a lieutenant 
is at least 2.5 times the median or 1.2 times the average monthly public sector salary. At worst, 
combat officers’ salaries lie below the median monthly income and/or the average monthly 
salary. This is the case for lieutenants in Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Kuwait. 
While systematic historical data on combat officer salaries is nearly impossible to obtain, 
anecdotal references in the literature suggest a similar picture for earlier decades. In the case 
of the Egyptian Free Officers, whose 1952 coup inspired many other COCs, Aclimandos (2004, 
69 and 113) quotes a salary of 18 Egyptian Pounds (EGP) per month for Ahmed Hamroush 
and 20 EGP for Gamal Abdel Nasser. A second lieutenant earned between 12-15 EGP per 
month. By comparison, monthly university fees at the time amounted to 5 EGP, that is, roughly 
the equivalent of 40 percent of a lieutenant’s salary. The economic status of combat officers is 
aptly summarized by an Egyptian officer: “Military ranks struggle like the rest of Egyptians 
because, like Egyptians society [sic], the wealth is concentrated at the top and does not trickle 
down” (quoted in Bou Nassif 2015, 264). This means that the ability of combat officers to 
                                                          
2 This assumes that elite officers hold the highest military position in the pay scale. The data 
generally reflect military salaries in the mid-2000s and early 2010s. See Table A3 in the online 
appendix (OA) for details (supplementary file).  
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substitute public services, such as health care and education, for private ones is very limited 
and, in most cases, simply absent. Combat officers crucially rely on the state to provide social 
welfare.  
Taken together, non-military government spending has different effects on the 
grievances of different agents within the military hierarchy. Combat officers typically hail from 
the middle class and perceive military service as a professional job and an opportunity of 
upward social mobility, with higher levels of education and a prestigious position in formal 
employment (Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003; Droz-Vincent 2007; Bou Nassif 2013; Boehmelt, 
Pilster and Tago 2017). Yet, they proportionally benefit much more from, and have to rely 
more on, social spending than elite officers. Hence our third hypothesis: 
H3: Social spending reduces the risk of combat officer coups and has no effect on elite officer 
coups. 
Apart from military spending, authoritarian incumbents make decisions that more 
indirectly impact on officer incentives to stage coup attempts. In association with broader 
accounts of regime type (Hiroi and Omori 2013; Johnson, Slater and McGowan 1984), the 
literature on structural causes of coups pointed to vibrant civil societies (Putnam 1967; Fossum 
1967; Powell 2012) and the establishment of constitutional procedures in consolidated 
democracies (Perkins 2013) as important deteminants of coup risk. While the link between 
democracy and coups is well-established, it does not help us much when assessing the 
effectiveness of coup-proofing strategies in autocracies. Although establishing a liberal 
democracy would substantially decrease, if not eliminate, coup risk, in practice this does not 
constitute a viable coup-proofing strategy designed for autocrats to stay in power.  
However, political liberalization, while falling short of erecting liberal-democratic 
governance, has been applied by some regimes as an authoritarian survival strategy (Albrecht 
and Schlumberger 2003; Heydemann 2007). While political liberalization works to expand 
opportunities for civil society and possibly civilian regime members as well, it remains 
potentially risky for elite officers. Political liberalization typically entails the establishment of 
civilian institutions regulating state-society relations, including political parties, elections, and 
parliaments. Such institutionalized political arrangements tend to compromise officers’ 
position in the ruling elite in that they impose more scrutiny on the army’s organization and 
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budget. They also decrease officers’ influence in favour of civilian authorities or rivalling 
centres of power.  
By contrast, we expect combat officers’ preferences for liberalization to be similar to 
those of ordinary citizens. Liberalization should assuage the political grievances they 
experience living under an authoritarian system. Roll-back coups against such processes of 
political openings should witness attempted take-overs by elite officers, while combat officer 
would stay in the barracks. Indeed, the Algerian political opening in the early 1990s highlights 
the potential dangers of liberalization, triggering an elite officer coup to terminate the process. 
Thus, our fourth hypothesis reads as follows: 
H4: Political liberalization increases the risk of elite officer coups and decreases the risk of 
combat officer coups.  
Finally, economic crises and shocks have been shown to increase coup likelihood in 
that they compromise capacities of authoritarian governments to sustain spending levels 
relevant for coup-proofing. The research program on the interplay of economic development 
and coups identified commodity price crashes, sudden policy changes, structural adjustment, 
or environmental impact on the production of agricultural goods as factors increasing the 
probability of coups (Hiroi and Omori 2013; Kim 2014; Casper 2015; O’Kane 1981). More 
broadly, low levels of economic development are believed to affect the likelihood of coups 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984; Londregan and Poole 1990; 
Hiroi and Omori 2013), although more recent cross-national studies cast doubt on explanations 
drawing on economic wealth (Powell 2012; Singh 2014; Svolik 2013). While we acknowledge 
these factors, it is unclear how their impact would be different for elite and combat officers: 
GDP per capita raises the costs of coups for both groups, just as economic crises negatively 
affect spending relevant to both groups and are likely to increase societal support for a coup in 
general. The same holds true for arguments about “ethnic stacking” (Jenkins and Kposowa 
1992; Roessler 2011; Harkness 2016; Bellin 2012; Nepstad 2013) as filling the officer ranks 
with co-ethnics is likely to increase the “loyalty norm” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) for 
both elite and combat officers. 
 
Capacities and Opportunities 
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Arguably one of the most influential approaches in the study of coup risk and coup-proofing 
emphasizes the need for coup plotters to coordinate among each other. To develop this point, 
we draw on those works that explain coups as coordination games (Casper and Tyson 2014; 
Little 2017; Marcum and Brown 2014; Singh 2014; Svolik 2013; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
2015). Coordination is important to learn about the individual preferences of fellow coup 
plotters and eventual adversaries, but also about the likely reactions of other regime elites and 
broader society. Casper and Tyson (2014) argue that large-scale public protests provide a 
public signal of the incumbent’s weakness to coup plotters, which can serve as a focal point 
for coordination in addition to signaling likely popular support for the coup (Galetovic and 
Sanhueza 2000; Johnson and Thyne 2016).3  
Since a military coup is a form of collective action, both elite officers and combat 
officers will need to coordinate among themselves to execute a plot. That said, there exist 
significant differences concerning the incumbent’s ability to increase coordination obstacles 
for elite officers and combat officers. Elite-officer coup plotters coordinate among themselves 
horizontally, that is, across larger military units. This is to accumulate what Naunihal Singh 
(2014) calls “soft power”, including the ability to gather information about what is happening 
inside the armed forces, control over news made public, and the position of forces outside of 
the military organization, such as regime elites, social movements, and international players 
with a strategic interest in the country’s politics. The way elite officer coups are planned and 
conducted thus means they are generally not meant for exercising physical violence during the 
plot’s execution. Rather, they seek to establish a fait accompli through their commanding 
position in the military hierarchy to render fighting unnecessary. This is why the vast majority 
of EOCs in the Middle East (70 percent) occurred without any casualties among coup plotters 
as well as their potential adversaries.4  
Combat officers, in turn, generally lack the institutionalized networks to coordinate and 
the power to have their decisions translated through the military hierarchy. Instead, they rely 
on their “hard power” (Singh 2014, 35-37) – access to weapons and direct command over 
                                                          
3 Wig and Rod (2016) make a similar point about incumbents’ weak electoral performance. 
Piplani and Talmadge (2016) argue that periods of interstate conflict also undermine officer 
coordination. 
4 See Table A4 in the OA for casualty data on MENA coups (supplementary file).  
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enlisted men – when they make surprise moves on strategically and symbolically important 
locations in the country’s capital city. In order to prepare for a coup, combat officers coordinate 
vertically with their rank-and-file soldiers for they rely on the fire power of their soldiers. 
Fighting other units in this scenario is thus not uncommon as strategic locations need to be 
secured. In fact, 60 percent of all COCs in the Middle East have entailed casualties, which 
provides evidence for a crucial difference between elite and combat officer coups regarding the 
mechanisms underlying coup attempts.  
To give but a few examples of the salience of elite-officer coordination, military take-
overs amid mass protests in Egypt, in 2011 and 2013 respectively, have been made possible 
through close coordination of the top officers in the Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
(SCAF). This council represents all branches of the military. Hence, the coups were staged by 
the military as a corporate organization. The crucial importance of coordination among the 
officers’ top brass in the SCAF for a successful coup appears in Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s stunning 
announcement, 48 hours prior to the 2013 coup, that the military would intervene should then-
president Mohammed Morsi not step down. In a similar vein, the 1992 coup in Algeria was 
prepared by an unofficial council comprising all officers in the Algerian army in the rank of 
general, then referred to by Algerians as “le pouvoir”. 
Combat officer coups, follow a different script. Similar to the 1952 take-over of power 
in Egypt by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the military coup in Turkey in 1960 was orchestrated by a 
small group of mid-ranking officers led by a colonel, Alparslan Türkeş. That coup unfolded in 
an overnight move and was made public through a radio announcement on the early morning 
of 27 May 1960. What is more, combat officers need to deploy rank-and-file soldiers for a 
show of physical force in order to make the coup attempt successful. The military coup in North 
Yemen in 1962 was successful primarily because coup plotters employed the few armored 
vehicles available to the Yemeni army at the time, which secured victory in a short fight with 
loyalist forces. Underlining their difficulty to coordinate horizontally, most combat officer 
coups were thus carried out by particular army units, typically from the ground forces: Iraq’s 
1958 coup plotters relied exclusively on the 19th and 20th Army Brigade; the Libyan coup 
plotters in 1969 mostly hailed from the Signal Corps; and the 1971 coup attempt in Morocco 
was carried out by the cadets under Commander Ababouh. 
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To prevent such coups, many incumbents employ counter-balancing, that is, the 
creation of ground-combat capable paramilitary organizations operating autonomously 
alongside the regular armed forces (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Powell 2014; Singh 2014; 
Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2016; De Bruin 2017). Counter-balancing establishes fragmented 
security environments, consisting of regular and paramilitary forces. From the plotter’s 
perspective, counter-balancing thus reduces the likelihood of a coup’s success and hence 
increases the costs of a coup plot if it result in military infighting. Coordination among officers 
is therefore essential in avoiding the possible failure of the coup. 
Interestingly, the effect of counter-balancing on coups remains inconclusive. While 
some authors identify a direct causal link between counter-balancing and coup risk (Powell 
2014; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2016), others emphasize the limitations of coup-proofing 
(Boehmelt and Pilster 2015; De Bruin 2017; Sudduth 2017a). In fact, our intuition is that 
differentiating between coup agents allows for a more fine-grained analysis of coup-proofing 
effects. In view of our discussion of coordination, we argue that counter-balancing is 
particularly effective to fend off elite officer coups. Take a unified security environment, such 
as in Egypt, as an example. In the absence of independently operating paramilitary forces, elite 
officers’ communication for their intervention in politics is facilitated by the presence of a 
unified military command, comprising roughly 15-20 officers who would meet on a regular 
basis to discuss military-related matters. The establishment of parallel combat-ready forces 
where elite officers would operate alongside the regular military’s chain of command would 
add uncertainty to these commanders’ willingness to make military intervention a fact.  
What is more, in many Middle Eastern armies, counter-balancing often goes hand in 
hand with ethnic stacking. In Syria as much as in Libya under Gaddafi, Yemen under Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, and Iraq during Saddam Hussain’s reign, both officers and soldiers in elite 
units and militias have been recruited from among particularly loyal personnel, tied to the ruler 
through religious, tribal, or family bonds. Counter-balancing thus creates a crucial obstacle in 
establishing the fait accompli, and elite officers will probably hesitate to move until they have 
overcome this obstacle.  
The situation is different for combat officers. Owing to the fragmentation of military 
organizations on the level of individual combat units (battalions and brigades), coordinating 
among all these units for coup attempts remains unrealistic. Where they turn into coup plotters, 
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combat officers call their own units into action but are likely to face other units not complicit 
with the coup and potentially loyal to the embattled political incumbent. Combat officers 
therefore have to overcome the threat of resistance from the armed forces irrespective of the 
presence of a unified or fragmented military command structures. Whether the presidential 
palace is guarded by a special force or regular troops, their typically substantial resistance is 
likely going to be taken into account. In Syria, for example, the 4th Armored Division is an elite 
unit within the regular Syrian army responsible for defending the Syrian regime from internal 
threats. As shown by Naunihal Singh (2014), it is combat officers’ show of physical force and 
a surprise move directed at the political incumbency – catching the incumbent “off guard” – 
that keeps units not involved in the coup in their barracks. This explains significantly higher 
casualty numbers in combat officer coups compared to elite officer coups (see Table A4 in 
online appendix, supplementary file). Our fifth hypothesis therefore reads as follows: 
H5: Counter-balancing reduces the risk of elite officer coups and has no effect on combat 
officer coups. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Data and Method 
We test our expectations regarding the effectiveness of various coup-proofing strategies using 
annual data from 18 MENA countries.5 Our focus on the Middle East and North Africa is 
particularly valuable for the purpose of our inquiry for two reasons. First, we find that the data 
to test our theoretical expectations – a dataset distinguishing coup agency and high-quality 
social spending data – are currently only available for the Middle East. Second, apart from the 
quality of the empirical material, among all authoritarian regimes the MENA region has been 
by far the most successful in reducing the number of coups per country since the 1970s (see 
Figure 1). While other world regions have also witnessed a significant decline in coup numbers, 
particularly Latin America and South-East Asia, this is in great part the consequence of 
successful democratization, which has been highlighted as a key mechanism to reduce coup 
risk (Johnson, Slater and McGowan 1984; Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014), rather than the 
success of coup-proofing as an authoritarian power-saving exercise.  
                                                          
5 A list of the all included countries is shown in Table A1 in the OA (supplementary file).  
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Figure 1: Average decline of coups per country per decade 
 
 
Notes: The figures were derived by calculating the change of the number of coups per (authoritarian) country in 
each region for each decade since 1970. This figure was then averaged and multiplied by 1000 for better 
readability. Authoritarian regimes defined as countries with Polity < 7. Coup data taken from Marshall and 
Marshall (2014). 
 
To measure our dependent variable, we use a novel dataset on coups d’état in the Middle 
East from 1949 until 2013 (Albrecht 2015). Importantly for our purposes, the dataset 
distinguishes between elite officer coups emanating from the military leadership and combat 
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officer coups carried out by lower-ranking officers.6 The data account for 89 coups in total, of 
which 38 were EOC and 51 were COC.7 The temporal distribution of these coups (Figure 2) 
shows a peak in the early 1970s, followed by a steady decline into the late 2010s.  
 
Figure 2: Coups by agency in MENA over time 
 
 
Regarding coup-proofing strategies, data on Counter-balancing is taken from Pilster 
and Böhmelt and measure the number of ground-combat capable organizations present in a 
given year (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). Based on refined data from the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, the variable captures the extent to which paramilitary organizations exist 
                                                          
6 To operationalize the difference between EOC and COC, we adopt Albrecht’s distinction 
between “centralized” and “sectoral” coups. We conceptualize the former as Elite officer coups 
that include the chief-of-staff, the minister of defense, or members of Revolutionary Command 
Councils among the coup plotters. All other coups are Combat officer coups, which may 
include officers in higher ranks. As we are primarily interested in the degree to which higher 
officers have access to political decision making, rather than their exact rank in the military 
hierarchy, this operationalization is suitable for our purposes. See Albrecht (2015, 683). 
7 Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table A2 in the OA (supplementary file).  
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alongside the regular armed forces. This sets these organizations apart from non-combative 
units of the security apparatus, such as port authorities or maritime police, which are of little 
use in the face of military power. 
Regarding social spending, we combine two data sources to measure a country’s 
welfare effort. We use social spending data from the IMF Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS) that measure combined expenditures in the fields of education, health, housing, and 
social protection (IMF 2011). As social spending data are spotty or missing from the GFS for 
a number of MENA countries, we also use an alternative measure for social spending from the 
Global State Revenue and Expenditure (GSRE) dataset (Lucas and Richter 2016). The GSRE 
is based on annual reports from the IMF archives and details a country’s expenditures and 
revenues from the earliest available year after joining the IMF until the late 2000s. Its functional 
classification of social spending comprises the same categories as the IMF data, which means 
that the measures can be used complementary. We thus use the GSRE whenever IMF data are 
not available.8 Our preferred measurement of social spending, Welfare/budget, represents the 
share of social spending in total expenditures in a given year. Compared to other ratios, such 
as the share of GDP, this measurement most adequately captures a regime’s welfare 
commitment (Brown and Hunter 1999, 782; Nooruddin and Simmons 2009, 854).9  
The variable Military spending per soldier (logged) is taken from the Correlates of War 
material capability database and measures the per capita level of spending for each member of 
the armed forces in current USD (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Compared to absolute 
levels of defense spending, this measurement more adequately captures the level of resources 
combat officer can be expected to receive. The variable is log-transformed to correct for the 
discernible skewness of the data. The variable Military spending/budget uses the above-
mentioned Correlates of War data divided by the total level of government expenditures taken 
from the World Bank’s (2016) World Development Indicators and indicates the share of 
                                                          
8 Correlation between both datasets is very high, ranging between 0.75 and 0.80 depending on 
the specific ratio (share of GDP or budget). If both sources are available, we prioritize the data 
source with the highest number of observations. 
9 The findings are robust to alternative measurements of social spending (Table A8 in OA, 
supplementary file).  
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defense spending in the overall budget. We expect this variable to be of particular importance 
for elite officers.  
To measure political Liberalization, we follow Böhmelt and Clayton (2017) and include 
the first difference of the annual Polity index taken from Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2010). 
Positive values signify periods of political liberalization, while negative values signify the 
intensification of authoritarian rule. 
We also include a number of standard control variables. Income effects have been found 
to significantly reduce the risk of coups (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Kim 2014; Londregan and 
Poole 1990). Two variables account for potential income effects: GDP per capita (logged), 
measured in constant 2005 USD, and Growth, indicating the percentage change of per capita 
GDP. Data are taken from the Maddison dataset (Bolt and van Zanden 2014). We also control 
for Resource rents per capita (logged) as conflict over resources could potentially increase the 
likelihood of military intervention or, on the contrary, allow for more efficient support buying. 
The variable measures the annual income from oil and gas per capita in constant 2009 USD as 
compiled by Ross (2013).  
Political instability and civil unrest have also been emphasized as potential triggers for 
military take-overs as coup-plotters might interpret the outbreak of domestic unrest as a sign 
of regime frailty (Casper and Tyson 2014). Similarly, the occurrence of violent domestic 
conflict, such as civil wars, might propel the military into a role of political prominence and 
thus facilitate coups (Svolik 2013). We therefore include an indicator of domestic Instability 
(logged), taken from Banks (2011), which sums up and log transforms the number of 
assassinations, general strikes, anti-government demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla warfare in 
a given year. In addition, we include a measure of Domestic conflict, which represents the total 
number of minor and major domestic armed conflicts in a given year.10 Data for the latter are 
taken from Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015).11 As both variables occasionally code for coups 
                                                          
10 Minor conflicts entail between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths, with major conflicts 
representing anything exceeding this amount. 
11 Including interstate conflict as a control variable is not possible in our baseline probit model 
as the variable does not vary in years preceding coups and is dropped by the model. We include 
the variable War from Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015) measuring the total number of 
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as well (Powell and Thyne 2011), they have both been cleaned to only capture non-coup unrest 
and domestic conflicts.  
We further control for the level of Ethnic fractionalization, taken from Alesina et al. 
(2003), as underlying ethno-religious conflicts can provide an important motivation for military 
interventions (Roessler 2011). Finally, since coups can engender coups and thereby keep 
countries in a “coup trap” (Londregan and Poole 1990), we include a variable Past coups 
accounting for the number of past coup attempts, both successful and unsuccessful. 
Given the binary nature of our outcome variable, we use a pooled probit model to test 
our hypotheses. To model time dynamics in our data, we include time-spell polynomials in our 
model following Carter and Signorino (2010), with a time spell representing the number of 
years since the last coup attempt, either by elite or combat officers, depending on the specific 
model.12 This effectively allows the time dynamic to take any distributional shape and thus 
captures the underlying, time-dependent coup risk in each country. In addition, we lag all 
regressors, with the exception of our measure of prior coup incidents, by one year to ensure the 
correct temporal dependence between our independent variables and the outcome. All standard 
errors are clustered by the unit of analysis to correct for heteroscedasticity across countries. 
 
Main Results 
Table 1 and 2 below display the findings for our baseline model for elite and combat officer 
coups respectively. Models 1-4 test the effect of each coup-proofing strategy on its own, only 
controlling for time dynamics and the number of past coups. Model 5 tests the effect of political 
liberalization. Model 6 tests the simultaneous effect of all coup-proofing strategies plus 
liberalization, while Models 7 and 8 successively add economic and political control variables. 
In the case of combat officer coups, the results confirm our hypothesis that social spending is 
the single most effective strategy to avert such coups (H3). Although three out of four strategies 
                                                          
interstate conflicts in a given year in the linear probability models in the OA (Table A6, 
supplementary file).  
12 Coup-specific time spells yield a slightly better model fit; hence we chose this specification. 
We present models with a time spell measuring the elapsed time since any coup attempt along 
with alternative time specifications in the OA (Table A5, supplementary file).  
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seem to matter when tested for individually, the welfare variable is the only one to have a 
consistent diminishing effect on the likelihood of COC. We also find strong support for our 
liberalization hypothesis (H4) as political liberalization significantly decreases the likelihood 
of junior officer coups.13 
The size of the welfare effect is demonstrated in the marginal effects plot in Figure 3. 
When increasing the proportion of welfare in the budget from 15 to 65 percent –which roughly 
corresponds to a move from the lowest to the highest percentile – the probability of combat 
officer coups diminishes substantially, from about 7 percent on average down to nearly 0 once 
welfare expenditures exceed the 40 percent mark. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of political 
liberalization on COCs. Liberalization reflected in positive changes in the Polity measure 
significantly reduces the risk of COCs, while autocratization increases it. Taken together, the 
results confirm H3 on welfare spending and H4 on liberalization, while our expectations 
regarding military spending (H2) are not borne out in the data. 
 
Figure 3: Social spending and combat officer coups   
 
Note: All other covariates are held at their means. Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence interval.  
                                                          
13 To make sure our findings are not driven by the dropping of observations due to listwise 
deletion, we use multiple imputation (MI) to test a complete model in the robustness section.  
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Figure 4: Liberalization and combat officer coups 
 
Note: All other covariates are held at median/mean. Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence interval.  
 
Turning to our findings for elite officer coups in Table 2, we find strong evidence in 
support of our main hypotheses. The pattern is similar to the previous results in that most coup-
proofing strategies seem to have a significant effect when taken in individually. However, only 
three measures retain their significance as we add economic and political controls: structural 
coup-proofing measures that counter-balance different security forces against each other 
represent an effective way to avoid coups carried out by the military leadership (H5). We also 
find that higher shares of military spending in the budget significantly reduce the risk of EOCs, 
thus confirming H1. Social spending, in turn, has no effect on EOCs (H3). Finally, in line with 
H4 and contrary to the effect on COCs, we find that political liberalization has a positive effect 
on EOCs, suggesting a higher likelihood for coups.  
To illustrate the effect of the counter-balancing strategy, we plot the marginal effects 
of increasing the number of ground-combat capable organizations on the likelihood of elite 
officer coups in Figure 5. As we can see, creating one additional paramilitary organization 
reduces the probability of such coups by more than 50 percent, whereas the presence of three 
competing (para-)military organizations seems to reduce the risk of elite officer coups 
practically to 0. Figure 6 demonstrates the rapidly decreasing probability of coups as the share 
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of defense spending increases from 10 to 65 percent of the budget.14 Finally, the effect of 
political liberalization is shown in Figure 7. The risk of EOCs increases by 70 percent as 
incumbents liberalize the political system at the equivalent of three Polity points, while 
strengthening authoritarianism seems to have an appeasing effect on elite officer. In sum, we 
find strong evidence for H1, H3, H4, and H5. 
 
Figure 5: Counter-balancing and elite officer coups 
 
Notes: All other covariates are held at median/mean. The way counterbalancing is measured allows for 
increments smaller than 1. Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
                                                          
14 For better comparison, we chose to use a similar illustrative range of military spending as 
for social spending. Spending levels between 10 and 65 percent of the budget have been 
common in the Middle East, and frequently reflect the difference between war and peace time.  
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Figure 6: Military spending and elite officer coups 
 
Notes: All other covariates are held at median/mean. Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 7: Liberalization and elite officer coups 
 
Notes: All other covariates are held at median/mean. Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence interval. 
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Table 1: Coup-proofing against combat officer coups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Welfare/budget t-1 -2.826     -5.326 -5.444 -5.265 
 (1.357)**     (2.080)** (2.681)** (2.182)** 
Past coups t-1 0.023 0.011 0.021 0.022 0.004 0.036 0.046 0.034 
 (0.041) (0.019) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.031) (0.054) (0.055) 
Mil. spending per soldier (logged) t-1  -0.312    -0.265 -0.009 -0.043 
  (0.068)***    (0.166) (0.236) (0.209) 
Mil. spending/budget t-1   0.134   -0.359 0.219 0.430 
   (0.463)   (0.863) (0.526) (0.393) 
Counter-balancing t-1    -0.288  -0.281 -0.370 -0.172 
    (0.166)*  (0.310) (0.307) (0.317) 
Liberalization t-1     -0.097 -0.311 -0.256 -0.247 
     (0.034)*** (0.104)*** (0.111)** (0.110)** 
GDP p.c. (logged) t-1       -0.387 -0.372 
       (0.242) (0.241) 
Growth t-1       -1.828 -1.809 
       (2.772) (2.823) 
Resource rents p.c. (logged) t-1       -0.070 -0.072 
       (0.055) (0.063) 
Domestic conflict t-1        0.121 
        (0.353) 
Ethnic fractionalization t-1        1.037 
        (0.974) 
Instability (logged) t-1        -0.063 
        (0.271) 
N 703 1,007 837 889 1,146 485 469 466 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled probit model with cluster-robust standard errors. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 2: Coup-proofing against elite officer coups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Welfare/budget t-1 -0.044     -0.752 0.443 0.055 
 (0.922)     (1.235) (1.343) (1.360) 
Past coups t-1 -0.015 -0.020 -0.039 -0.034 -0.024 -0.064 -0.141 -0.202 
 (0.048) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026) (0.021) (0.073) (0.110) (0.143) 
Mil. spending per soldier (logged) t-1  -0.284    -0.274 0.215 0.268 
  (0.093)***    (0.204) (0.215) (0.217) 
Mil. spending/budget t-1   -0.210   -1.907 -6.585 -6.382 
   (0.577)   (1.807) (2.102)*** (2.350)*** 
Counter-balancing t-1    -0.444  -0.387 -0.875 -0.970 
    (0.198)**  (0.273) (0.376)** (0.349)*** 
Liberalization t-1     0.090 0.012 0.060 0.099 
     (0.035)** (0.038) (0.042) (0.049)** 
GDP p.c. (logged) t-1       -0.001 -0.134 
       (0.395) (0.389) 
Growth t-1       -4.203 -3.912 
       (2.676) (2.915) 
Resource rents p.c. (logged) t-1       -0.134 -0.106 
       (0.057)** (0.071) 
Domestic conflict t-1        0.011 
        (0.256) 
Ethnic fractionalization t-1        0.357 
        (1.198) 
Instability (logged) t-1        0.524 
        (0.226)** 
N 703 1,007 837 889 1,146 485 469 466 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled probit model with cluster-robust standard errors. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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The lack of evidence for the effect of military spending on combat officer coups is 
striking, though in line with similar findings on military spending in the literature (e.g., Singh 
2014). Our immediate suspicion is that military spending divided by the number of soldiers 
only represents a very crude measure of officers’ financial compensation. For instance, in 
contrast to other types of expenditures, military spending is typically characterized by high 
levels of capital expenditures for new machinery and arms from which often only a select 
subset of officers – such as pilots or artillery divisions – benefit. In the absence of better data 
on the distribution of current expenditures within the armed forces, we experimented with a 
measure that subtracts the amount of arms purchases from total military expenditures in order 
to more closely reflect the amount spent on soldiers’ salaries. Yet even this refined measure 
did not show any significant effect of military spending on COCs.15  
 
Robustness Tests 
To ascertain the robustness of our findings, we run a series of sensitivity tests that corroborate 
our results on social welfare and counter-balancing, while our findings on military spending 
and political liberalization survive most yet not all robustness tests.  
To begin with, as we introduce welfare spending as an alternative fiscal coup-proofing 
strategy, it is important to ensure that the effect is indeed driven by spending levels and that 
our measure does not proxy for more long-term, structural variables in the realm of social 
development that cannot be easily manipulated by the government. We therefore rerun our 
baseline model on COCs successively including child mortality (logged), land inequality, and 
literacy rates as social outcome indicators into the regression (Table 3). Data for child mortality 
are from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2015) and literacy rates from 
Banks (2011). Regarding land inequality, we follow Ansell and Samuelson who measure land 
inequality as (1-family farms)(1-urbanization) to take into account the size of the rural 
population (Ansell and Samuels 2014, 116). Data for both variables are from Vanhanen (2003) 
and linearly interpolated for missing years.16 When testing the simultaneous effect of outcome 
variables and social spending, it is social spending and not the outcome variables that comes 
                                                          
15 Results are available upon request.  
16 Both variables exhibit strong trends which makes linear interpolation a justifiable approach.  
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out significant, albeit diminished in size and at a lower level of significance. This backs our 
intuition that it is the government’s policy in the area of social welfare, rather than absolute 
levels of human development, that combat officers care about.  
 
Table 3: Welfare spending vs. structural variables 
 (COCs) (COCs) (COCs) 
Welfare/budget t-1 -5.513 -4.965 -4.676 
 (2.322)** (2.787)* (2.398)* 
Mil. spending per soldier (logged) t-1 -0.076 -0.237 0.019 
 (0.216) (0.154) (0.212) 
Mil. spending/budget t-1 0.584 1.471 0.227 
 (0.353)* (0.569)*** (0.401) 
Counter-balancing t-1 -0.177 -0.440 -0.216 
 (0.319) (0.362) (0.339) 
Liberalization t-1 -0.242 -0.368 -0.267 
 (0.107)** (0.177)** (0.120)** 
Child mortality (logged) t-1 -0.166   
 (0.210)   
Land inequality t-1  1.620  
  (1.844)  
Literacy rate t-1   -0.001 
   (0.001) 
N 466 329 466 
Time Polynomials Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled probit model with cluster-robust standard errors. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Another important concern is the distortive effect of missing data as result of listwise 
deletion, which occurs when cases drop out of the analysis because of individual missing 
values. Only recently, Lall (2016) found that in a large sample of studies nearly half of the key 
results disappeared when the effect of listwise deletion was taken into account. To make sure 
our findings are not an artefact of missingness, we use multiple imputation to create complete 
datasets and rerun our baseline model on these multiply imputed datasets (King et al. 2001; 
King and Honnaker 2010). Specifically, we use the R program Amelia II (King and Honnaker 
2010) to impute 50 datasets with cubic time effects, lags and leads for a number of regressors 
(Welfare/budget, Military spending/budget, Military spending per soldier (logged), GDP p.c. 
(logged), Resource rents p.c. (logged)), and a ridge prior of 0.1 percent of the number of rows 
in the dataset. We generated two separated imputed datasets and, as before, ran our estimation 
separately for combat officer coups and for elite officer coups. 
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In light of the results displayed in Table 4, we can be confident that our findings are not 
purely driven by listwise deletion: social spending and political liberalization continue to exert 
a significant, diminishing effect on the likelihood of combat officer coups. In turn, counter-
balancing (and political liberalization) retain their significant negative (positive) effect on elite 
officer coups. Interestingly, using imputed datasets we now find support for H2 regarding the 
effect of per soldier spending on combat officer coups, while we could not recover our earlier 
significant finding for Military spending/budget – in fact, the variable changes sign in the 
analysis. We also find only weak or no support for on an effect of Military spending/budget in 
a number of additional robustness tests (see below and OA, supplementary file), which prompts 
us to interpret our results on military spending as indicative and in need of further 
corroboration.  
 
Table 4: Estimation using multiple imputation 
 (COC) (EOC) 
Welfare/budget t-1 -2.189 0.921 
 (1.138)* (1.444) 
Mil. spending per soldier (logged) t-1 -0.218 -0.087 
 (0.092)** (0.109) 
Mil. spending/budget t-1 0.336 0.267 
 (0.444) (0.536)  
Counter-balancing t-1 -0.022 -0.561 
 (0.256) (0.240)** 
Liberalization t-1 -0.084 0.080 
 (0.034)** (0.044)* 
Past coups t-1 -0.006 -0.031 
 (0.025) (0.038) 
GDP p.c. (logged) t-1 -0.069 -0.180 
 (0.138) (0.156) 
Growth t-1 -0.208 -0.704 
 (0.876) (1.026) 
Domestic conflict t-1 0.322 0.064 
 (0.165)* (0.219) 
Ethnic fractionalization t-1 0.784 -0.386 
 (0.555) (0.496) 
Resource rents p.c. (logged) t-1 -0.020 0.016 
 (0.031) (0.036) 
Instability (logged) t-1 -0.023 0.213 
 (0.105) (0.114)* 
NxT 1452 1452 
Time polynomials Yes Yes 
Pooled probit model with cluster-robust standard errors. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Note: Coefficients based on 50 multiply imputed datasets created in Amelia II. 
Estimations were done using Zelig 4. 
 
Further robustness tests are detailed in the online appendix (see supplementary file) and 
can only be summarized here and in Table 5 below. They include a regression model with 
alternative time specifications (OA, Table A5), a random effects linear probability model 
(LPMs) (OA, Table A6), and a model with additional as well as alternative controls, such as 
urbanization, a military regime dummy, ethnic exclusion instead of fractionalization, and the 
presence of political parties (OA, Table A7). We also test alternative measurements of social 
spending (OA, Table A8). Finally, we estimate a rare events logit (OA, Table A9), a fixed 
effects logit model (OA, Table A10), and a GMM-LPM model (OA, Table A11). The latter is 
used to, at least technically, take into account endogeneity between the dependent and 
independent variables. All tests confirm our central findings regarding the effect of social 
spending on combat officer coups and counter-balancing coups. The effect of Military 
spending/budget and Liberalization is robust to most tests with the notable exception of the 
fixed effects logit and the (GMM) linear probability models. Giving ongoing debates about the 
usefulness of LPMs for binary outcome variables, we would caution against placing too much 
weight on these non-findings. That said, supporting evidence for these two variables is certainly 
weaker and results should thus be viewed with caution. 
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Table 5: Summary of robustness tests in Online Appendix 
 Baseline 
model 
Alternative 
time 
specifications 
LPMs Additional 
controls 
Alternative 
measurements 
of welfare 
spending 
Rare 
events 
logit 
Fixed 
effects 
logit 
GMM-
LPM 
Welfare 
spending 
 
        
Military 
spending/soldier 
 
        
Military 
spending/budget 
 
       N/A  
Counter-
balancing 
 
        
Liberalization 
 
          
Note: Shaded cells designate findings confirming our hypotheses; empty cells designate null findings; mixed cells 
designate weak or partially confirmatory findings.  
 
Conclusions 
Our findings provide strong empirical support for our contention that elite and combat officer 
coups and, by extension, the strategies by which these coups can be prevented are 
fundamentally different. In turn, these results corroborate our understanding of the incentive 
environment of different coup types. Elite officer coups are largely driven by political 
ambitions of supreme officers and internal regime dynamics. Hence, only high military budgets 
and organizational counter-balancing seem to be effective strategies to keep them in the 
barracks, while political liberalization prompts these elite officers to stage defensive roll-back 
coups. Combat officers, however, are similar to ordinary members in society. Their coup 
attempts can be avoided most effectively through increased social spending as they 
proportionally benefit more from it than elite officers. Political reforms in the direction of a 
more liberal polity also decrease the risk of combat officer coups. These results bear 
implications for coup-proofing autocrats and political scientists alike.  
Autocrats will note our mixed findings about the assumed coup-proofing effects of 
military spending. High military spending in comparison to other budget items almost certainly 
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helps to please elite officers, while combat officers’ grievances are largely driven by factors 
unrelated to military spending. Given the effect of social spending on the prevention of combat 
officer coups, autocrats might want to reconsider budgetary spending patterns when coup-
proofing is part of the calculation. Increasing military budgets will work well to counter 
eventual coup threats from the military’s top-brass, while reallocating financial resources 
toward social spending can be seen as a successful attempt to ward off threats from lower and 
mid-ranking officers. 
Our findings also have major implications for scholarly debates on authoritarian 
regimes, military coups, and civil-military relations more broadly. First, our findings apply to 
the study of change in authoritarian regimes and will not travel easily to explaining coups in 
democracies. In the latter, coups remain an unlikely phenomenon for democracies that have 
established institutionalized avenues of elite competition, making coups a less attractive 
vehicle to take over power. Our findings speak directly to a growing body of literature 
distinguishing between specific types of coups as mechanisms of authoritarian regime change 
(see, e.g., Aksoy, Carter and Wright 2015; Lehoucq and Perez-Linan 2014; Marinov and 
Goemans 2014; Tansey 2016). While junior officer coups tend to trigger more substantial 
political transitions—change of authoritarian regimes—elite officer coups may quite well be 
seen in the context of elite struggles and regime adaptation—change within authoritarian 
regimes.  
Second, scholars of civil-military relations will note our claim to expand the perception 
of militaries as corporate organizations. Most works in this research tradition hold constant the 
military’s institutional interests by determining the assumed incentives of higher officers. Our 
understanding of coups as different types of military behavior directly challenges these 
assumptions. Rather than invoking the chain-of-command to aggregate “the” military’s 
behavior as a function of elite officers’ interests, accounting for the interests of different agents 
within this corporate body will provide a better understanding of the causal underpinnings of 
coups d’état, as well as military behavior more broadly.  
Third, our contribution to the body of literature on military coups makes a strong case 
to taking individual military agency more seriously. We find empirical evidence that 
individually designed coup-proofing measures work well to keep officers in their barracks, but 
measures targeting the military as a whole do not. Our findings have direct implications for the 
 33 
theoretical understanding of coups and, in particular, the employment of a definition of the 
military coup as an elite-led exercise. Disaggregating types of coups and analyzing the specific 
causal underpinnings of combat officer coups calls this definition into question. Our core 
premise that combat officer coups follow a different logic than elite officer coups does 
therefore not sit well with existing accounts, such as prominent work by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006), analyzing “the” military as a corporate organization essentially representing 
elite interests in a struggle for the distribution of economic goods. This is true, we believe, for 
the upper echelons of the officer corps, but not for lieutenants, colonels, and even higher 
ranking officers without political clout. The article therefore contributes to an emerging 
scholarship unpacking different types of coups as mechanisms of regime change in autocracies.  
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Supplemental Information 
Supplemental information is available at http://www.ferdinandeibl.com/publications and the 
International Studies Quarterly data archive. 
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